Where is russia on the dtm

To reduce the magnitude of error, we based our analysis on the average of two annual distributions of mothers obtained by the "forward" method—from to , and the "reverse" method—from to The accuracy of our estimation seems satisfactory. Total age-specific fertility rates for each birth order, calculated for — in the usual way, and the parity-specific fertility rates, estimated on the basis of the distribution of women by the number of children already born from the and censuses, are shown in Figure 2.

This confirms our assumption made earlier that total first-birth fertility rates, as well as second-birth rates obtained in the conventional way, appear to have been inflated for the mids and, conversely, deflated for the beginning of the s. The difference in intensity of second births recorded between and looks less substantial. Generally speaking, however, our calculations intended to help interpret the period indices have introduced nothing new in our substantive conclusions. The intensity of fertility of the first three orders has, indeed, grown significantly during the s, while its drop in the early s was not less significant.

At the moment, we choose the latter. The age distributions of women by parity obtained by the above mentioned method enable us to reconstitute fertility patterns in cohorts of women born between and and giving birth to children during — The cumulative average number of children born in female cohorts by different ages is presented in Figure 2. Two stages of evolving cohort fertility can be easily distinguished.

The declining fertility trend continued with cohorts of women born in the s, s, and in the first half of the s.

Whereas women born in — gave birth to 3 children during their reproductive life, those born in the early s had about 2. For women born around , the peak of reproductive activity occurred in the second half of the s.

Starting with cohorts born at the end of the s, all following cohorts had, on average, more children than their immediate predecessors. It is only in and that the growth of cohort fertility has ceased. After 23—32 years, women have begun to delay births. In spite of this, by none of the cohorts, even the most recent ones, has returned to the level of much lower fertility observed fifteen years ago.

The cumulative frequency for birth orders 1—5 in cohorts of women born between and observed during the period — are shown in Figures 2. A few important points become evident when examining Figure 2. The first concerns the stability of the level of permanent childlessness in all cohorts having completed or nearing the completion of their procreation period: 7—8 percent of all women remain permanently childless. The second point is associated with a clearly discernible tendency toward younger first-order fertility.

Apparently, the tendency toward younger motherhood has emerged in Russia since at least the mids. Both period and cohort fertility measures appear to confirm this. It should be noted that in the mids, due to incentive effects of pronatalist measures, a considerable acceleration of family formation occurred.

While by , 18 percent in the female cohort had their first child by age 20, the corresponding proportion in the cohort was already 26 percent. The same pattern of younger motherhood is also recorded for other ages, from 15 to 25 years.

First, it clearly shows the increasing probability of second births in all the cohorts born after , up to It is even so for the most recent cohorts, born during the first half of the s: they gave birth to their second child by a specified age more frequently than those born 10 years earlier.

Secondly, the magnitude of the increase in the proportion of women who had their second child at a younger age is really phenomenal. By age 25, 18 percent of women of first parity in the cohort had a second birth while in the cohort the corresponding figure was 24 percent. The probability of a third birth increased during the s as well, particularly in the second half of the s for mothers 30 years and over.

For younger mothers, the growth of third birth fertility was not that appreciable, and, for women at ages below 24, the probability of a third birth was tending to decrease Figure 2. The population policy of the s did not bring about an increase in the probability of having a large family—it only served to accelerate the timing of the first through third child. Instead, cohorts, one after another, gave birth to children of higher orders less and less frequently, confirming the observation that a two-child family had become the universal and most desired family model for the Russian population.

It is now clear that the intense governmental intervention in the area of population during the s favored a trend, which had emerged somewhat earlier, to a stabilization of the final number of children in families at the two-child level.

During the — period, the TFR exceeded 2. It is the change pattern of the second-birth probability that has been shaping the dynamics of the total fertility rate during the last two decades.

Due to the implementation of the pronatalist measures, the second-birth probability for women at both younger and older ages increased considerably. Though women over 25 also had an increased probability of a third birth, their contribution to the final size of TFR was not substantial enough to determine the overall trend. The contribution of fourth- and higher-order fertility is statistically insignificant, being in line with its more stable, historical declining trend.

The results of our cohort analysis seem to leave no doubt that the post-war cohorts of Russian women have displayed a stabilizing and even upturning trend in fertility in conformity with the two-child-family size, reaching a high of 1. The incentive effect of the pronatalist measures introduced during the s in Russia was twofold. First, the average number of births in cohorts having completed their reproductive activity grew.

This means that a fraction of second and third births would probably not have occurred unless the pronatalist measures had been taken. On the other hand, women had their first three births at younger and younger ages, and reduced the intervals between births more frequently than before, thus continuing a tendency which had emerged earlier. A considerable portion of families achieved their reproductive goals earlier, giving birth to the desired number of children during a short period of five to six years, and did so at a younger age as compared with the preceding cohorts.

During —, there has been a slowdown in the tempo of cohort fertility due to the postponement of births of the second and third order while first birth is not delayed.

The fact that five years earlier many of the cohorts had produced their first and second births ahead of the "normal" schedule appears to have made a considerable contribution to the fall of TFR during the early s.

Despite a recent significant drop in age-specific fertility in the absence of the mentioned policy measures, none of the cohorts, even the most recent, has returned to the relatively "slower" tempo of family formation characteristic of the end of s Table 2.

A slight decrease in cohort fertility during the early s can be observed for women who by reached the ages of 23— No doubt, today's hard times for Russian society play a role in the postponement of births observed recently. At the same time, one should take into account the possibility that today the population may be coming back to the former more natural and moderate tempo of procreation.

The shift to longer intervals between births seems to be an inevitable "negative" compensation for the pronatalist population policy pursued during the s. For now, statistical evaluation of the contributions of each of the mentioned factors to the postponement of births is not possible. It is clear that both the end of pronatalist policies and the economic downturn of the s have affected current fertility dynamics.

During the last three years — , their overall contribution to the drop in fertility, in terms of completed mean number of children per woman, can be estimated to not exceed 0. No sign of the impact of recent developments on the younger cohorts has been detected.

One should keep in mind that births postponed today due to changes in family plans might be made up a few years later, representing still another short-term shift in birth timing in a number of cohorts, similar to that observed in the s. In this case, the completed number of births would behave as if no postponement had occurred. The cohort analysis presented above clearly demonstrates that there is not sufficient evidence to associate a so-called "crisis" in Russian fertility with the current political and socioeconomic situation, as is frequently done in the media with non-professional speculations about population issues.

As shown in the first section of this paper, a complex process of change in fertility behavior patterns has been occurring in the West since the late s. To achieve the relatively small number of children desired, people were modifying their behavioral patterns in ways that have been termed "the second demographic transition.

The mentioned signs of the second demographic transition are mainly associated with fundamental changes in the individual life cycle in general, and with changes in individual goals with regard to the timing of marriage and family formation, in particular.

Modern sexual norms imply a free choice of partner and type of conjugal life, mutual responsibility for the potential outcome of intimate relations, effective birth spacing, and a functional attitude to contracting or dissolving of marriage. In short, the increased opportunities for an individual to mold his life on his own are tending to be realized through a different model of nuptial and reproductive behavior.

As a result, a new pattern of fertility timing has begun to emerge. This new fertility model has, no doubt, become possible owing to the development of effective contraceptive means and techniques, offering unprecedented opportunities for couples to pursue their own strategy with respect to the desired number of births and their spacing. The first indication of a changing fertility model in Russia was that the upward trend in fertility for the 15—19 age group has reversed since The increase in adolescent fertility observed until that moment may be attributed to earlier initiation of premarital sexual relations associated with "the sexual revolution.

Let us follow the process underlying the changes in age-specific patterns of fertility in advanced countries, taking as a starting point the onset of its decline in age group 15— The countries selected for a comparative analysis [49] differ in the initial date of steady fertility decline at ages 15—19 from in Sweden to in Greece.

In the United States the decline has been occurring since — It can be noted that the decline in adolescent fertility is quite independent of overall levels of fertility. TFR varied from 1. As mentioned above, the desired final number of children and desired timing of births appear to be relatively independent and, to a certain extent, adaptable characteristics of fertility.

At the beginning of the mentioned changes, not all the countries under study had a fertility rate at ages 20—24 higher than at ages 25— For instance, for Australia, Italy, and Sweden, the ratio of the former to the latter was 0. However, by the onset of the change process, this index tended to rise in all the countries without exception, even in those where the corresponding ratio was below unity.

The highest values of the ratio were recorded for Hungary 1. It reached 1. The decline in adolescent fertility is followed after a certain interval by reductions in the ratio of fertility rate at ages 20—24 to that at ages 25— On average, the length of the time lag ranged across the countries from one to five years.

However, certain countries, for instance, the United States, had no delay at all. The countries with higher ratio values needed, naturally, more time to level off the rates of fertility at these age groups.

Thus, in Hungary the leveling off process has not yet been completed, while it lasted 18 years in Austria, 10 in the United States, 9 in Greece, 6—7 in Germany and France, and 2 years in England and Luxembourg. The next stage in the process of transformation of the age pattern of fertility is characterized by increasing absolute and relative contributions to overall fertility by the 30—34 age group, and then the 35—39 age group.

Recently, in the most advanced populations, a slight rise in fertility rates has been recorded even for ages 40— The change in age fertility pattern, therefore, represents, from a statistical standpoint, a process of successive redistribution of births from younger age groups to older ones.

During such a redistribution, a drop in the size of TFR tends to occur due to both the incomplete realization of postponed births the postponement of birth across a few cohorts underlies the changes in age-specific fertility and to diminishing numbers of unplanned and unwanted births, particularly at young ages. In other studies of the evolution of regional demographic differences in Russia, of cross-country comparisons of demographic transition patterns, [50] and of modeling the mortality transition [51] we have attempted to model the entire process of age-curve modification.

The basic variables used in these studies are the tempo of change in fertility for each age group and in the ratio of fertility intensities for different age groups, using the initiation of the decline in adolescent fertility as a starting point.

Since the given process is to be presented in an imaginary comparable time scale, the impact of the overall fertility levels can be eliminated to a certain extent.

To evaluate the range of variation in indicators of change in age-fertility patterns, we have constructed indices for a set of the countries under study using the same time scale. As was already mentioned with regard to major features of population evolution, Russia has tended to follow in the footsteps of the most advanced populations.

Throughout the twentieth century Russia was either lagging behind or rapidly catching up with the vanguard group of countries.

Because of this, an illusion of a unique pattern of Russian demographic change arose. Indeed, Russia had in the past, and still has, a number of important, distinct features of population dynamics, including in fertility. However, in practice most of them are nothing more than extreme peripheral points and variants of a generalized statistical space of variations or value area acceptable within certain limits of other countries. This approach to identifying the location of the Russian population in a European or even in a global demographic space enables us not only to interpret the current changes in population trends, but also to make assumptions about future prospects of fertility change in Russia.

By the early s, no signs were observable of the onset of a second demographic transition in Russia. Even the capital city regions had barely begun to join in the process, which had emerged in the advanced countries over the past two decades. However, Russia could be considered to be exhibiting a 'pre-transitional' pattern of age fertility of an extreme variant that stands out very clearly against not only the western European countries but even certain countries of eastern Europe.

Peculiarly Russian features of this 'pre-transitional' pattern are a more pronounced dissymmetry and a higher age concentration of births resulting from earlier nuptiality and a greater concentration of births at young ages. Until recently, Russian women had their children at younger and younger ages, with a greater concentration of births in the youngest age groups.

In , the fertility rate in the 15—19 age group in Russia was A similar level was observed in in Australia, until in New Zealand, until in the United States, while Canada did not show the described pattern at all. In Russia, over several decades, with the exception of only a short period in the mids, the contribution of ages 25—49 to total fertility was falling.

The contribution by mothers aged 15—24 accounted for 56 percent of TFR in , the all-time high for western European countries and non-European developed countries in the post-war period. Only in such eastern European countries as Bulgaria, the former GDR, and Hungary did the process of fertility shifting to younger ages go somewhat further than it did in Russia.

Nonetheless, the fertility trends of recent years provide us with some evidence suggesting that Russia seems to be starting to embark on a second demographic transition.

Since , the 15—19 age group has been exhibiting decreasing fertility. This is an important sign of the onset of the transition to a new fertility age pattern. In our view, a reduction of fertility in this age group can hardly be of a period-specific character, as that should occur in the other age groups.

As already mentioned, the preceding growth of adolescent fertility resulted largely from changes in the sexual behavior of youth—from poor knowledge about contraceptive methods and a predominantly non-economic attitude to marriage and family at the time.

From the beginning of the s, adolescent fertility exhibited a strikingly steady upward trend. It did not respond to any external interventions or have breaks in its monotonic trend, as was the case in the other age groups during certain periods. So, we may assume that behind the appearance of fertility decline in that age group must be factors beyond changes in the political and economic climate. In the period before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, signs of the second demographic transition could be readily found in a number of Eastern European countries e.

In addition, it is important to note that the transition to a new model of fertility in Russia may be stimulated or is already stimulated? In any case, in the near future we can expect increasing responsibility in contracting a marriage, in recognition of its growing economic significance.

This will inevitably result in an increase in the mean age at first marriage and, correspondingly, in the mean age at first birth. Consequently, the new fertility model may appear even sooner than it might be expected in conditions of gradual, evolutionary changes. The figure shows that the fertility rate at ages 20—24 is higher than at ages 25—29 and the tempo of change of their ratio appears to be very slow.

The redistribution of births between these age groups in the latter's favor is believed to have taken place over a rather long time. The contribution of age groups 30—34 and 35—39 to fertility tends to increase, but the rate of increase grows at different speeds through the course of transition. The decline of the age-specific fertility rate for the youngest age group 15—19 is slower than that in the advanced countries.

The second demographic transition involves a complex adaptation process modifying the whole system of reproductive behavior that may bring about, particularly in its first stages, not only change in the age pattern of fertility, but also reductions in its overall level. It appears likely that this very process is responsible for the similarity in the transition patterns found currently in Russia and the central and southern European countries, as well as for their common features distinguishing them from the countries of northern and western Europe, where the transition started earlier and was to a lesser extent conditioned by obstacles of an ideological or religious character.

The negative population change and rapid fertility decline that Russia experienced at the beginning of s brought contradictory responses in public opinion and in professional publications. The real stage that Russia's fertility transition has reached at present can be found only by conducting a demographic analysis of the process over a relatively long historical period. The analysis of fertility since the beginning of the 20th century through recent decades in comparison with other advanced countries shows that Russia has followed a unique path in fertility trends during the entire period under study.

Russia's peculiarities were caused by differences in its initial date of transition and in its process of social modernization. Russia's social and political transformations have had great consequences for its population history.

Its demographic processes were influenced by social catastrophes which repeatedly broke the long-term patterns of population change. Ultimately, however, social crises could not overcome the major evolutionary component of Russia's population dynamics.

Fundamental patterns of fertility change have forced their way through the chaos of irregular fluctuations in birth rates and unequal demographic contributions of different generations. The postwar period vividly demonstrated opposite trends in the total fertility rate TFR and completed fertility within most other countries in comparison with Russia. Fluctuations in these trends in Russia were determined by peculiarities in the timing of fertility: a shift to younger ages in nuptiality and fertility, a reduction of intervals between births, and a family planning model based on abortion.

The government's population policies during the s accelerated a transition to the two-child family model in Russia. On the other hand, it brought a further reduction in the intervals between births.

This tendency was broken in the s and, during the last decade, by sharp fluctuations in period fertility rates. The widespread public opinion is that the economic slump has caused a slowdown of fertility. It is easy to associate the changes in economics with the current postponement of births. However, the results of cohort analysis have revealed the superficiality of this explanation.

The postponement of higher-order births in the s reflects the shift to longer intervals between births and can be considered as a compensatory effect for the pronatalist policy of s.

None of the cohorts has returned to the slower tempo of family formation of the s. Hence, the growth and subsequent fall of the TFR during the —s appears to be a peculiar artifact that resulted from the distribution of women by the number of children already born or intervals between births.

Thus, there is not sufficient evidence to associate the decrease in Russian fertility with the current political and economic crisis.

Future social and demographic developments and continuing research should serve to clarify the correlation between fertility and social changes in Russia.

A complex process of change in fertility patterns over the past three decades has occurred in most Western countries. Those shifts are mainly associated with changes in the individual life cycle, and, in particular, in the timing of marriage and family formation. All these trends are interpreted as "the Second Demographic Transition. Russia has tended to follow in the footsteps of the most advanced populations, but at present the Second Demographic Transition in Russia is still in its infancy.

Most of the specific features of Russia's fertility dynamics appear to be extreme points of a generalized statistical range for the more advanced nations. If the Second Demographic Transition progresses further in Russia as in other developed countries, it will be apparent in tendencies toward nuptiality and fertility at older ages and changes in the scheduling of these demographic processes. Zakharov's paper suggested that the analysis of fertility trends should take into account both government policy and structural socio-economic changes.

Pro-natalist measures e. Thus in Russia, current and future fertility policies should be based on the country's socio-economic circumstances. Demographic policy decisions need to be incorporated into the whole system of social and economic development policies.

The complexity of this matter calls for a new methodology of analysis. Sophisticated analytical tools must be employed to assess the net impact of government's policies on reproductive behavior in general, and specifically, on proximate determinants of fertility such as marriage, contraception, and abortion. Induced abortion remains possibly the most common and effective means of family planning in Russia.

Russian society and the public health system have adapted to the provision of induced abortion as the primary method of family planning. Therefore, Russia can be defined as having a stable abortion culture. Induced abortion is still the primary and often the only method of reducing fertility in many regions. At the same time, there is a high degree of regional differentiation in family planning behavior related to ethnic, social, and demographic variations across Russia.

Since , new "post-Soviet" features have emerged in family planning in Russia. This has been due to the following societal trends and organizational innovations introduced by the Ministry of Health of Russia:. An entirely new phenomenon is the use of the induced abortion issue for a wide variety of political purposes. There has been a demonopolization of the position of the Ministry of Health as the only agency endowed with powers to formulate social policy in the field of family planning.

Traditionally, the Ministry of Health has been involved in the fight against abortion, mostly through the ineffective publication of new orders and leaflets. Many newly established organizations are now involved in this area.

Among them are the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian Association of Family Planning, various women's political organizations, and nationalist political movements. There is also active participation by various religious groups and religion-related public movements, such as the Roman Catholic Church and, associated with it, the "Pro-Life Movement" and "Right-to-Life International.

The Russian Orthodox Church became very active in the field of anti-abortion propaganda by publishing miscellaneous pamphlets, leaflets, and articles in early s. Even the Orthodox Church in America has been involved in such anti-abortion activities. Beginning in , the state monopoly in medical family planning services was progressively destroyed, and legal commercialization of induced abortion and contraceptive services ensued. This decentralization and legal commercialization has occurred mostly in the larger cities and economically advanced regions of Russia.

In most cases this process was merely the legalization of pre-existing illegal and quasi-legal commercial enterprises, which functioned in the "gray" field of gynecological and abortion services before Now a real abortion industry exists in Russia and this branch of the market for family planning services is totally oriented to the provision of induced abortion. Another initiative is to increase female labor force participation, which includes a focus on technological innovation as a way to raise productivity, reduce caregiver burdens, and minimize healthcare costs.

Japan has raised its retirement age, which Russia also did recently, and is relaxing immigration restrictions to augment the size of its workforce. Sweden is also promoting active aging , including advancing how it deals with long-term illnesses.

Finland faces the enormous challenge of seeing its long-term growth rate drop to 1. As such, the country is finding innovative ways to manage long-term care, including by promoting self-managing facilities for the elderly, using modern technologies to expand remote care, and supporting its elderly through virtual nurse and doctor visits.

Similar to Japan and Sweden, Finland is also looking to increase immigration to compensate for the sharp decline in its labor force. What are the main takeaways for Russia, if it is to adequately address its demographic challenges? First is the importance of immigration: in the high-income countries of Western, Southern, and Northern European that have rapidly aging populations, migrants help bolster the size of the working-age population and significantly increase the size of the labor force.

Attracting migrants — especially high-skilled migrants — in the years ahead will be essential for Russia. Equally, this process needs to be carefully managed and adapted to Russian realities to avoid fueling social backlash to immigration.

Population momentum is t he propensity for a growing population to continue growing even through fertility or birth rate is declining positive momentum. On the other hand, it also includes the tendency for a population to continue to fall despite a rise in birth rate negative momentum. Population momentum naturally occurs towards the end of stage 3 of demographic transition.

Even though the birth rate may be falling in a country, the natural increase in terms of total number may be rising due to population momentum. Positive momentum is typical for a stage 3 to 4 country in demographic transition with high base of youthful population. Negative momentum has been observed in case of the stage 5 countries with high numbers of elderly population. DTM worksheet. Setup Menus in Admin Panel. Demographic transition model DTM. The five stages of the demographic transition model Stage One: The Pre-Industrial Stage highly fluctuating — high stationary Both birth rate and death rate are high Population fluctuates due to incidence of famine, disease and war.

High infant mortality and very low life expectancy. Rural societies dependent on subsistence agriculture. Total population is low and balanced due to high birth rates and high death rates. Stage Two: The Industrial Revolution early expanding —very rapid increase Death rate falls sharply due to improvements in health care and sanitation.

Birth rates remain high. From humble origins in South Africa, it's been a remarkable journey so far for the current series leader, but he knows that the title is a long way from settled just yet. Switching to GT3 regulations marked a fresh start for the DTM in , but it has also drawn a line in the sand against other series using similar cars by engaging AVL Racing to develop a bespoke Balance of Performance system.

But despite some initial BoP-based teething troubles, there were some pleasant findings as the 'new DTM' got underway at Monza. It's taken him a while to emerge as a consistent title challenger, but in the final year of DTM's Class One rule set, Nico Muller has smoothed the rough edges and has double champion stablemate Rene Rast working harder than ever to keep up in the title race.

Opel's fortunes in the DTM had taken a turn for the worst by - hardly the pedigree that suggested it could take on the toughest hour race of them all. But that's exactly what it did. On the 20th anniversary of the resumption of hostilities in the DTM, Autosport revisits a classic season that brought a staple of German motorsport back to life with a bang and set in motion the careers of some notable names. It's 20 years since the DTM roared back into life at a packed Hockenheim with a back-to-basics approach as the antidote to its high-tech past.

Now it's on its knees again, so is it time to recall the lessons learned in ? Tickets Subscribe. Sign in. Registration Sign in Facebook connect. All me.